Now this is the R&P you were waiting for.
Grifman wrote:Zarathud wrote:Grifman wrote:Huh, you're forgetting something, along with the liabilities of over $5 trillion , they also have assets of over $5 trillion. Duh! You can't forget the other half of the balance sheet!
Except the other half of the balance sheet sucks. To use your example, the liabilities are constant (or increasing), and the value of the assets is decreasing. That's a weak balance sheet.
A couple of points here:
1) What evidence other than mere assertion do you have that their balance sheet sucks?
Perhaps you missed that whole home mortgage and mortgage-backed securities crisis that's been in the papers for months now. Fannie and Freddie guarantee those mortgages. From
Fortune 7/10/08:
Former St. Louis Federal Reserve president William Poole tells Bloomberg that the firms are already insolvent and may need a bailout. Freddie Mac owed $5.2 billion more than its assets were worth in the first quarter, making it insolvent under fair-value accounting rules, Poole said.
We can argue whether changing the accounting rules is "fair" and how leverage should be reported on balance sheets, but let's look at the
simplified current 2007 balance sheet before any accounting changes:
Most of the nearly $800 billion in assets held by Freddie as of the end of 2007 consisted of mortgage loans or securities based on mortgages. The company acquired the resources to buy these assets primarily by borrowing, with outstanding debt as of the end of 2007 of $738.6 billion. The key item on the liabilities side of the balance sheet is stockholders' equity, which represents the capital raised by Freddie through direct sales of stock and cumulative retained earnings. This equity provides a cushion against possible losses on any of its assets, in that the first $26.7 billion in losses would come out of the company's original capital, with creditors losing nothing. That cushion, however, would only cover losses that were less than 26.7/794.4 = 3.4% of the assets.
That's quite a thin cover given the amount of mortgages Freddie and Fannie were backing, increasing from 25% of outstanding residential mortgage debt in 1990 to 41.4% today.
Grifman wrote:2) The OP was talking as if we were going to be on the hook for their $5 trillion dollars in liabilities. As I pointed out, that's bogus since they were ignoring the balance sheet. And even it is weak, it is certainly not worthless.
My question isn't that there will a dollar-for-dollar bailout (that's worst case scenario), but there's turmoil any time an organization gets forced into bankruptcy. The risk is that the residential mortgage market FAILS when the organization guaranteeing 41.4% of the outstanding residential mortgage debt goes into bankruptcy even if the company's not totally worthless.
Grifman wrote:The question is the size of the problem, and it's not a $5 trillion dollar problem - not even close.
When the transmission falls off the car, is the question how much it's going to cost to fix? No. The immediate problem is that your car isn't going anywhere. I don't think arguing over the size is the appropriate question to debate.
Grifman wrote:Right isn't the issue if it involves avoiding a depression or economic collapse. I doubt any politician would be able to say, "I did the right thing not bailing out those Freddie and Fannie" while the country wallows in a depression caused by that collapse.
The real issue is the moral hazard from the failure to regulate while Freddie and Fannie were able to leverage at terms nearly as favorable as those for the Treasury itself based on the assumption that there would be Federal intervention. The market is already pricing the risk of government not intervening and the consequences to Fannie and Freddie, and pretty much freaking out after reassessing the risks associated with their business.
The Preacher wrote:Almost all loans in this day and age are sold off to investors as securitized loans. And every company is moving them off their balance sheets as a result of that sale. FAS-140 is changing the gain on sale accounting that has been in place for 20+ years. These financial institutions have been operating above board in all of these transactions.
Leverage is a bitch, and Fannie and Freddie aren't selling them off entirely to investors since they're still guaranteeing the loans. The accounting rules of moving them off-book have allowed financial institutions to bury or fail to inform investors about the cascading effects of downside risks from heavily leveraged portfolios. The returns looked great when the market performed and you could assume the Federal government would intervene, but the cost was additional risk that wasn't obvious.
It's simply not accurate to portray Freddie and Fannie as "operating above board in all of these transactions" or innocent victims of an accounting rule change. Goverment regulators in 2004 discovered problems going back to 2001 with
internal accounting controls and earnings manipulation, such as amortization, treatment of derivatives, and other structural problems resulting in an overstatement of earnings and an understatement of risk. Each company restated earnings
-- Freddie by $5 billion and
Fannie by $6.3 billion, with Fannie Mae paying a record $400 million civil fine in a settlement with OFHEO and the SEC.
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary argued at the time for additional regulation and claims that Fannie and Freddie were inappropriately operated under a
hedge fund model. New regulation didn't happen, and instead the Bush administration had been recently
relaxing some of the restrictions imposed after settlement of those $11.3 billion of accounting misstatements. Even the old rules failed to be sufficiently transparent to allow investors to be adequately informed of the real risks. You can't allow 40% of the mortgage market to essentially be backed like a hedge fund with systemic accounting problems, and implied government guarantees.