Defiant wrote:I knew that the 24 days was the maximum (as opposed to the minimum) but your article implies that they could call a vote right away:
Critics claim that because the process could, in theory, take up to 24 days, it means Iran can force inspectors to wait 24 days. This is false. Iran does not control every step of the process — the US and its allies could force a vote on the international commission right away, for example — so it is nonsense to argue that Iran could unilaterally delay inspection up to 24 full days.
My understanding Iran could delay the process for at least the initial 14 days, because all parties (which includes Iran) have to be in agreement, and only then could a vote be called to resolve the dispute and then Iran has three days to comply. Which means 17-18 days minimum, which isn't a whole lot better than 24 days. (And certainly isn't the anytime, anywhere access the administration said there would be months ago)
We have anytime, anywhere on known enrichment and research sites, and as few as 3 days to as many as 24 days to other sites. When dealing with nuclear material, that amount of time difference is completely immaterial. For nuclear-related work, the IAEA will be tracking all equipment that is brought into the country that could find use in nuclear weaponization. If Iran is trying to do mechanical work outside of the eyes of the inspectors, their charade will collapse under the rapidity of spot inspections. If Iran is continually blocking access for as long as possible, they risk blowing up the deal. Iran has a lot riding on not blowing up this deal. They're not crazy, and it's silly to presume that they will constantly behave in an irrational manner that will lead to ever increasing demands for spot inspections beyond the known sites.
No, he did not. A handful of members of Congress, all of whom have been long expected to oppose the deal, claim that he said that. He and the French government have publicly denied that. Here's one thing we do know he has said: "During the meeting with the members of the US Congress on the 17th of July, I never said or suggested that a no vote from the Congress on the JCPOA might be helpful or lead to a better deal. I insisted repeatedly on the fact that the deal itself was the best possible."
It is a fantasy to believe that we would use "secondary sanctions" against our major trading partners (and creditors) to force them to continue or even strengthen sanctions that they think have run their course and produced the desired result.
My understanding is that this is a large part of why China came aboard in terms of implementing sanctions, earlier.
Everyone was wiling to come on board with the current sanctions regime because they were pointed at what was believed to be an achievable end: a strong deal to block Iran's path to the bomb. That end has been achieved. The chances that a deal stronger than this would win approval from the Iranian Parliament is slim to none. The negotiators know that. Our allies aren't going to swallow more economic loss to themselves if America blows up this deal. They're already rushing to reestablish the ties that they severed to help us bring Iran to the table, and their governments have already signed off on the deal or are about to do so.
The sort of secondary sanctions we'd have to impose to force them to keep the current sanctions in place, much less go further, would be disastrous for our allies' economies, could end up dragging the United States before the WTO, and would put our nation's credit rating at risk. Banking sanctions the likes of which Netanyahu talks about America imposing would also hit our own economy hard (not that he cares about America's economy) going into an election year. You're talking about Americans no longer being able to take out loans from car dealerships that sell foreign cars with direct banking connections to other nations. You're talking about America not being able to service its debt obligations to Japan or China or Germany, which could endanger the market for US Treasury Bonds and play directly into China's hands in terms of attempting to partially displace the US dollar and US treasury notes as the reserve stores of value internationally.
Those sorts of sanctions against our allies would not pass Congress. It is fiction to think that we'd go that far for this. You really think members of Congress will vote to harm the value of the dollar, lower our credit rating, and perhaps send us into a recession in order to force our allies to try to force Iran to give us a slightly better deal?
Unless you really think we're wiling to risk devastating our own economy and those of our allies in order to force Iran to give us a slightly better deal, I firmly believe that we have exhausted the diplomatic and economic paths to putting pressure on Tehran.
I'm not sure that I quite buy that characterization when we know of sovereign nations that voluntarily went through the process of entirely eliminating their weapons program, although I suppose their inspections since those programs got dismantled have not been as strong. Now if only Iran could be as forthcoming in it's cooperation and transparency as that.
Those were generally trustworthy, transparent nations. Iran is not. And the goal of this deal was not to make Iran trustworthy, nor is the deal based on an expectation that Iran will be transparent.
It pushes Iran's breakout to sufficient nuclear material for a bomb from three months today to a year in 15 years, and includes many inspection requirements that never expire under the Additional Protocols of the NNPT.
“What is a more relevant fear would be that in Year 13, 14, 15, they have advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point, the breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero,” Obama said.
link
[/quote]
The President's statement here does not align with what the non-proliferation and nuclear arms experts I've had briefings with have told me, or my reading of the text. I think he is presenting a worst case scenario wherein Iran has replaced all of its (pretty terrible) current centrifuges with ones as advanced as what we've been using recently. They're able to bring new centrifuges online late in the deal, so long as the total enrichment capacity of all active centrifuges does not increase.
