Octopus Overlords

malchior wrote: ↑Tue Sep 26, 2023 6:27 pm There is a report going around that Shoigu said that the "Special Military Operation" will continue until 2025. It seems to be going a whole lot longer than the original 3 days predicted.

Among the vineyards seeded with improvised explosive devices in Zhari, Kandahar, there was no possibility of maneuver. By 2012, the Taliban had place so many improvised explosive devices in the area that any attempt at doing the battle drills taught by the U.S. Army to suppress and maneuver on an enemy were suicide. The Taliban were innovative. They knew that when they ambushed us, we would seek cover and then attempt to maneuver on them. So the Taliban emplaced improvised explosive devices along walls, berms, and any piece of terrain in the flat floodplain of the Arghandab River that we might use for cover. When we received fire, our best reaction was to not seek cover; it was to simply lay down and return fire. It went against all our training, but it was the correct approach for the context of our fight in Zhari.

Today, at a much larger scale, the Ukrainian military is facing an enemy that impedes maneuver. As a result, the Ukrainian army is pursuing an attritional approach appropriate for the context of its fight. U.S. government sources, speaking anonymously to the media, have not appreciated the importance of Ukraine’s current situation. They have criticized the Ukrainian army for not conducting “combined arms maneuver.” One narrative is that some form of American training, with a bit more synchronization and air support, would cut through the minefields and drive the Russian military from their trenches.

Outsiders watching the conflict should have humility, especially when pushing U.S.-led training in combined arms maneuver as a panacea to any military problem. Context matters in war, and the U.S. military does not train to prevail in the context that Ukraine faces.

The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

Some might fear that such a theory of victory plays into the Russian military’s strategy, but there is no perfect alternative. Prematurely pursuing maneuver will only allow Russia to attrit Ukrainian forces. Ukraine will need to destroy Russian artillery and inflict casualties that thin Russian reserves at a favorable rate that outstrips Russia’s ability to replace those losses. It will be slow and grinding with constant competitive adaptation. It may not produce spectacular victories for social media consumption. Winston Churchill said of defeating the German U-boats’ campaign of exhaustion in the North Atlantic: “It did not take the form of flaring battles and glittering achievements, it manifested itself through statistics, diagrams, and curves unknown to the nation, incomprehensible to the public.”

At some point, vulnerabilities might begin to appear in the Russian lines and present Ukraine with an opportunity for spectacular victories. Such an opportunity previously arose with Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive in 2022. Similarly in 1918, the Allies finally could conduct a successful massed attack during the Hundred Days offensive when the German army began to collapse. Any attempt to conduct large-scale maneuver before then would be suicidal.

It can be hard to convey the context in which Ukraine fights. In western Kandahar, I did not have to deal with triple-stacked T-62 mines designed to cripple any breaching vehicle. But I still remember the strange sense of freedom of movement that I felt when, the day after returning from Afghanistan, I went for a hike in the evergreen trees of Washington. Being able to step anywhere without following closely behind two mine detectors seemed a surreal luxury. Ukraine does not have the luxury of conducting maneuver. It needs to pursue unglamorous attrition, and we must be prepared to support it until it exhausts the Russian invaders. And the United States should not forget how poorly its last attempt to remake an army in its image fared.

Chuck Schumer and Mitch McConnell are moving forward on a major Ukraine aid package, even as there’s a very good chance the next speaker is even less receptive than Kevin McCarthy was.

Majority Leader Schumer said he’s spoken specifically to McConnell about the issue and added “we’ll work together to get a big package done.” Ukraine was in the Senate’s bipartisan spending proposal last week, but was ultimately left out of the eventual stopgap government funding law approved over the weekend.

Now there’s no clear path forward, particularly since there isn’t even a House speaker. So the two Senate leaders appear willing to plunge forward on their own for now.

“We have large bipartisan majorities for aid to Ukraine, and we’re going to work to get it done,” Schumer said.

Max Peck wrote:This article provides a rebuttal of the narrative that Ukraine doesn't know how to apply NATO/American training and tactics against the Russian defenses.

Biting Off What It Can Chew: Ukraine Understands Its Attritional Context

Among the vineyards seeded with improvised explosive devices in Zhari, Kandahar, there was no possibility of maneuver. By 2012, the Taliban had place so many improvised explosive devices in the area that any attempt at doing the battle drills taught by the U.S. Army to suppress and maneuver on an enemy were suicide. The Taliban were innovative. They knew that when they ambushed us, we would seek cover and then attempt to maneuver on them. So the Taliban emplaced improvised explosive devices along walls, berms, and any piece of terrain in the flat floodplain of the Arghandab River that we might use for cover. When we received fire, our best reaction was to not seek cover; it was to simply lay down and return fire. It went against all our training, but it was the correct approach for the context of our fight in Zhari.

Today, at a much larger scale, the Ukrainian military is facing an enemy that impedes maneuver. As a result, the Ukrainian army is pursuing an attritional approach appropriate for the context of its fight. U.S. government sources, speaking anonymously to the media, have not appreciated the importance of Ukraine’s current situation. They have criticized the Ukrainian army for not conducting “combined arms maneuver.” One narrative is that some form of American training, with a bit more synchronization and air support, would cut through the minefields and drive the Russian military from their trenches.

Outsiders watching the conflict should have humility, especially when pushing U.S.-led training in combined arms maneuver as a panacea to any military problem. Context matters in war, and the U.S. military does not train to prevail in the context that Ukraine faces.

The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

Some might fear that such a theory of victory plays into the Russian military’s strategy, but there is no perfect alternative. Prematurely pursuing maneuver will only allow Russia to attrit Ukrainian forces. Ukraine will need to destroy Russian artillery and inflict casualties that thin Russian reserves at a favorable rate that outstrips Russia’s ability to replace those losses. It will be slow and grinding with constant competitive adaptation. It may not produce spectacular victories for social media consumption. Winston Churchill said of defeating the German U-boats’ campaign of exhaustion in the North Atlantic: “It did not take the form of flaring battles and glittering achievements, it manifested itself through statistics, diagrams, and curves unknown to the nation, incomprehensible to the public.”

At some point, vulnerabilities might begin to appear in the Russian lines and present Ukraine with an opportunity for spectacular victories. Such an opportunity previously arose with Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive in 2022. Similarly in 1918, the Allies finally could conduct a successful massed attack during the Hundred Days offensive when the German army began to collapse. Any attempt to conduct large-scale maneuver before then would be suicidal.

It can be hard to convey the context in which Ukraine fights. In western Kandahar, I did not have to deal with triple-stacked T-62 mines designed to cripple any breaching vehicle. But I still remember the strange sense of freedom of movement that I felt when, the day after returning from Afghanistan, I went for a hike in the evergreen trees of Washington. Being able to step anywhere without following closely behind two mine detectors seemed a surreal luxury. Ukraine does not have the luxury of conducting maneuver. It needs to pursue unglamorous attrition, and we must be prepared to support it until it exhausts the Russian invaders. And the United States should not forget how poorly its last attempt to remake an army in its image fared.

Carpet_pissr wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2023 3:56 pm How would he, in theory, even know that??

Is that on the black box? Cool! Let's hear it! Otherwise, STFU, you evil, beady-eyed fuck.

El Guapo wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2023 4:26 pm

Carpet_pissr wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2023 3:56 pm How would he, in theory, even know that??

Is that on the black box? Cool! Let's hear it! Otherwise, STFU, you evil, beady-eyed fuck.

They provided the hand grenades.

In the clip, a curious child appears to be talking to a Russian soldier sitting on a ledge holding a grenade in his hand.

The soldier at first makes a throwing movement, appearing to show the kid how the weapon works.

But taking everyone by surprise, he proceeds to actually pull the pin out of the live grenade and lob it down the street in Kazan, Russia.

Putin claims Prigozhin’s plane crashed because the Wagner leadership got drunk and/or high, then set off hand grenades during the flight.

malchior wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2023 5:49 pm FWIW I know enough Russian to hear him say something along the lines of it can't hurt or (maybe kill?) anyone to the woman yelling at him. My guess is it was a flash bang. Still WTF.

Also, at the beginning it sort of sounded like he was asking the kid to pull the pin for him.

Alefroth wrote: ↑Tue Oct 17, 2023 3:46 pm Ukraine uses ATACMS to damage aircraft and airfields-

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/1 ... e-00121932

wonderpug wrote: ↑Wed Oct 18, 2023 7:15 pm

Alefroth wrote: ↑Tue Oct 17, 2023 3:46 pm Ukraine uses ATACMS to damage aircraft and airfields-

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/1 ... e-00121932

Please tell me those are pronounced “attack ‘ems”

wonderpug wrote: ↑Wed Oct 18, 2023 7:15 pm

Alefroth wrote: ↑Tue Oct 17, 2023 3:46 pm Ukraine uses ATACMS to damage aircraft and airfields-

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/1 ... e-00121932

Please tell me those are pronounced “attack ‘ems”

Enter ATACMS, the Army Tactical Missile Systems, pronounced “attack ‘ems”.

"Great video of an AFU FPV drone chasing down a Russian loaf (UAZ-452 "Bukhanka")."

LordMortis wrote: ↑Wed Dec 13, 2023 7:52 am Hard to believe it's been a month since anyone's posted here. We do grow war weary. Do the Russians?

LordMortis wrote: ↑Wed Dec 13, 2023 7:52 am Hard to believe it's been a month since anyone's posted here. We do grow war weary. Do the Russians?

Blackhawk wrote: ↑Wed Dec 13, 2023 6:28 pm You know how politicians like to spin up a controversy just as a scandal is brought to light, resulting in nobody talking about the scandal?

Gaza happened. I don't know if Putin had any hand in it, but it was the biggest victory for him since this thing started.

Kraken wrote: ↑Wed Dec 13, 2023 10:14 pm And Zelinsky lobbied Congress for more aid in person, but Republicans are keeping it bottled up as extortion for their border agenda (much to Putin's delight).

The latest scuttlebutt says that the US is urging Ukraine to spend the next year bolstering its defenses and building up its own military industry, rather than pissing away its strength against near-impregnable Russian defenses -- the idea being to improve Ukraine's ability to stand on its own as US aid becomes increasingly unreliable. Ukraine's military leadership isn't down with that.