Pre-emption and unilateralism are the two most frequently used terms against President George W. Bush’s foreign policy in the current presidential election campaign. Sen. John Kerry, the Democrat Party’s presidential nominee, accuses Bush of breaking with an established tradition of American foreign policy. Kerry says the US should use force only after it is attacked, and then, only in conjunction with allies, and endorsement by the United Nations. Unilateralism and pre-emption, Kerry asserts, are alien to American traditions. But are they?
Both the kind of foreign policy that Kerry offers and the one practiced by Bush after Sept. 11, 2001 have deep roots in American history. When the United States emerged as an independent nation in the 18th century, virtually the entire world was dominated by European colonial powers. The chief concern of early American leaders was to steer clear of European rivalries, and avoid trouble in their own backyard.
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were anxious to keep the newly created nation out of foreign wars both as a matter of expediency and in response to pacifist sentiments preached by the Quakers at the time. Offering a peaceful life away from endless European wars was one of the attractions of the New World. Jefferson called that policy “duck and cover” which, in practice meant staying out of trouble even if that required eating a bit of humble pie. During the Napoleonic wars, for example, The United States decided to stop its maritime trade altogether so as to avoid possible clashes with the British and the French.
In 1812, however, the British attacked the United States, showing, not for the first time in history, that when a major war is fought somewhere it is bound to drag in other nations.
In August 1814 the British raided Washington, the new capital of the newly-created United States, and set The White House on fire. The surprise attack showed that “duck-and-cover” did not guarantee US security.
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams denounced “ the folly” of “ duck-and-cover” and came up with a new national-security policy that envisaged not only confrontation with actual enemies but wars of pre-emption against potential foes.
Adams concluded that the US had to abandon its low profile and become more conspicuous. Rather than fleeing from danger, the US had to identify and destroy its sources. Two centuries before George W Bush, Adams realized the danger of what we now call «rogue states». Such states could provide sanctuary for bandits and pirates, the precursors of today’s terrorists, or a foothold for hostile European powers. They, therefore, couldn’t be tolerated. The Adams doctrine found its first dramatic expression in a confrontation with Spain over Florida. Adams asked the Spanish who controlled Florida, to either properly police it or «cede it to the United States as a province.” It was in accordance with the doctrine of pre-emption that the US ended up by annexing Florida.
The Adams doctrine was adopted by other US presidents into the 20th century. President James Monroe used it as the core of his “doctrine” which defined any European intervention in the Western Hemisphere as a casus belli for the United States. President James K. Polk annexed Texas and California, and President William McKinley seized the Philippines to forestall that a European power might capture it.
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson, also used similar arguments to justify pre-emptive interventions in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and ultimately Mexico. The long arm of American pre-emption even reached North Africa where a US expeditionary force raided Algiers to put an end to pirates preying on American ships in the Mediterranean.
By the middle of the 19th century, Talleyrand, the statesman who had served four successive regimes in France, had this advice for European leaders:” Europe must keep its eyes open about America that is growing every day. (The United States) is destined to become a colossal power and the day will arrive when, conscious of its force, it would want to say its word on all issues. Prudence dictates that governments in the old continent refrain from giving the United States a pretext for intervening in Europe.” That pretext was provided in the course of the First World War when the Germans tried to interrupt American shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and ended up by sucking the US into the conflict.
What followed was almost a century of American involvement in Europe, including leadership in two world wars.
Several presidents, including Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge continued to build the American military strength while staying out of conflicts beyond the Western Hemisphere.
On the eve of the Second World War, President Franklin D Roosevelt revived the “duck-and-cover” policy in the hope of staying out of conflict. Roosevelt’s choice was partly dictated by pacifist sentiments in the United States, exploited by a pro-German lobby determined to keep the Americans out until Hitler defeated Britain. The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, forced Roosevelt out of “duck-and-cover” and into a position of leadership in the war against the Axis Powers.
Roosevelt did not practice pre-emption or unilateralism. Nor did he seek American hegemony. At Yalta he was prepared to share post-war Europe with Stalin and tried to rely on the consent of other international actors to create a stable global system.
Once the war was won, the US, under President Harry S. Truman, developed a containment policy. It was no longer possible to “duck-and-cover” in a world in which the Soviet leaders spoke of “burying capitalism” and conquering the world. At the same time, however, the US could not revive the pre-emptive doctrine of Adams that could have provoked a thermonuclear Armageddon. As a compromise, Truman developed a multilateralist policy centred on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), strengthened by smaller alliances in the Middle East and Asia.
But even then, Truman did not completely abandon the Adams doctrine. In 1946 and 1947 he used the threat of nuclear war to persuade Stalin to stop helping Communist guerrillas in Greece and to withdraw the Red Army from northwestern Iran. The American intervention in the Korean Peninsula could also be seen as a form of pre-emption because it prevented the North Korean Communists from annexing the south.
President Richard Nixon reinterpreted containment to mean détente which, in practice, amounted to giving the USSR a new lease of life thanks to American and allied economic aid, diplomatic equal treatment, and, more importantly, an effective Soviet veto on American defense policy.
Truman’s true successor, as an innovator of foreign policy, was Ronald Reagan who, as president, revived the 19th century American tradition of “preponderant power” as opposed to a balance of power that, by definition, kept the US at the same level as its weaker Soviet adversary. Reagan developed the “rollback” doctrine with the stated aim of destroying the Soviet “Evil Empire”.
President George W. H. Bush, the father of the present president, and President Bill Clinton were closer to Harding and Coolidge than Truman and Reagan. They used American power in war but failed to use their victories to reshape the status quo in accordance with long-term American interests.
The first President Bush liberated Kuwait but left Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq, creating an unstable situation. In doing so he ignored Machiavelli’s first lesson:” Never leave an enemy wounded and alive; either make him a friend or kill him!”
President Clinton used American power in Bosnia and Kosovo, but only to achieve short-term objectives.
The current President Bush started his term without a clear national security doctrine. At times he sounded like Theodore Roosevelt echoing the “walk calmly but carry a big stick” doctrine. At others he came across as a Jeffersonian “duck-and cover” strategist.
The Sept. 11, 2001 attack forced Bush to adopt a clear strategy. He could not have chosen “duck-and-cover” at a time that a majority of Americans, furious by the treachery used against them, were calling for action. Nor could Bush have adopted a Truman-like containment because it was not clear who to contain and where. He had to revive the Adams strategy, using American power to remove sources of threat.
What Kerry is offering is a synthesis of “duck-and cover” and containment, strategies that are not relevant to the present state of the world. The American voter has a clear choice.
I'd love to hear your thoughts on this article.
I pretty much agree with it.
