That is not dead which can eternal lie, and with strange aeons bring us some web forums whereupon we can gather
https://www.octopusoverlords.com/forum/
https://www.octopusoverlords.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=88685
In the coming pandemic, approaching someone for a hug is a killing offense. So keep your dirty hugs to yourself.Captain Caveman wrote:Where is Smoove? I want him to hold me.
Enterovirus. The group also contains, surprise, surprise, the poliovirus. To be fare, it also contains the rhinovirus, source of the common cold.J.D. wrote:Also, having a child in school I think I'm starting to get more concerned about this entovirus thingy floating around. Apparently the vast majority get the sniffles but there are some cases coming out now where kids are getting polio-like symptoms? WTF?
I'm not a boardgamer. I could be convinced to play poker, or engage in some consensual poop-eating.Isgrimnur wrote:You need a better hobby. Come to the boardgaming thing in Plano this month.
I was happy to see this too. It's nice that he's not sick, and anything that throws water on inflated public panic is a good thing.Captain Caveman wrote:Results for the Frisco case: Negative!
I could almost guarantee myself and a +1 for poker night. I don't know if coop's sociopathy would let him run the tables on us or prevent him from showing.Captain Caveman wrote:I'm not a boardgamer. I could be convinced to play poker, or engage in some consensual poop-eating.Isgrimnur wrote:You need a better hobby. Come to the boardgaming thing in Plano this month.
You're going to be nesting for months, of course you willIsgrimnur wrote:I could almost guarantee myself and a +1 for poker night. I don't know if coop's sociopathy would let him run the tables on us or prevent him from showing.Captain Caveman wrote:I'm not a boardgamer. I could be convinced to play poker, or engage in some consensual poop-eating.Isgrimnur wrote:You need a better hobby. Come to the boardgaming thing in Plano this month.
In either case, I'm not exactly set up to host anything.
Yep. I assume the health care worker was somehow careless, but they aren't giving any details about that... But I already anticipate massive panic around the "not even the CDC protocols can protect us" meme.J.D. wrote:Wait, so a trained health care worker with all the proper procedures and equipment gets sick, but the family living in his apartment using the same bathroom and using the same sheets and towels are still OK?
The worker became infected despite wearing full protective gear while treating Duncan, who later died from the disease, during his second visit to the hospital.
I'd like to counter that if the system was working, he wouldn't have been initially turned away, but that would probably be judged as harsh."I will tell you that the fact that we identified this individual so quickly is actually to me a sign that the system is working," he added.
I'm guessing there's a gap between what she was told to do, versus what she actually did. I don't want to imply laziness or ignorance, here either. So now contact tracing starts for her and this is extended out into November.J.D. wrote:Wait, so a trained health care worker with all the proper procedures and equipment gets sick, but the family living in his apartment using the same bathroom and using the same sheets and towels are still OK?
I read an article a week or two ago explaining that most people in Africa don't have addresses, even in the cities, and even beyond the shantytowns. Makes them wicked hard to track, not to mention preventing them from participating in much of modern society (getting bank accounts, registering to vote, etc). The story was about somebody who's using modern technology to impose addresses on huge swaths of the world that have never had them before. Science News? MIT Technology Review? My internet connection is flaking out so I can't look for it right now.Smoove_B wrote: it should give everyone an appreciation for the mess they're dealing with in Africa with thousands of infected people.
I was just reading about how social customs in West Africa often make quarantine difficult. In the West, we think nothing of parking ill family members in the hospital for days or weeks on end. In Liberia and elsewhere, abandoning a sick person to the care of strangers is considered almost heartless, and families will do everything they can to take care of their own. Obviously this makes it easy for highly contagious diseases to spread, but it's very strongly ingrained in the culture.Kraken wrote:I read an article a week or two ago explaining that most people in Africa don't have addresses, even in the cities, and even beyond the shantytowns. Makes them wicked hard to track, not to mention preventing them from participating in much of modern society (getting bank accounts, registering to vote, etc). The story was about somebody who's using modern technology to impose addresses on huge swaths of the world that have never had them before. Science News? MIT Technology Review? My internet connection is flaking out so I can't look for it right now.Smoove_B wrote: it should give everyone an appreciation for the mess they're dealing with in Africa with thousands of infected people.
Dr D'Alterio refers to OIE's document as a reference according to which the nurse's dog should not have been euthanized. Most likely, he refers specifically to the following statement in the said document:
"There is no evidence that domestic animals play an active epidemiological role in the transmission of the disease to humans."
It will be interesting to note whether the Spanish health authorities, while aware of the scarce scientific knowledge on the issue, may have based their difficult decision to euthanize the dog upon the "precautionary principle" or "precautionary approach." In short, the "precautionary principle" is a notion which supports taking protective action before there is complete scientific proof of a risk; that is, action should not be delayed simply because full scientific information is lacking. This principle has been an essential part of the international agreement (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the "SPS Agreement"), of which OIE is a signatory, an essential part thereof being the precautionary principle.
In some legal systems, as in the law of the European Union, the application of the precautionary principle has been made a statutory requirement in some areas of law.
The Spanish authorities could have been cognizant of OIE's document when discussing the dog issue before action was taken. OIE issued the document, "technical information sheet on Ebola virus disease outlining epidemiological observations and scientific knowledge of the disease including the animal reservoir," on 6 Oct 2014, the very day when the nurse was found positive for Ebola virus.
The potential role of dogs in Ebola epidemiology has been subject to a study, the results of which were published in 2005. For subscribers'
convenience, its abstract is copied below:
"Ebola Virus Antibody Prevalence in Dogs and Human Risk. Lois Allela, Olivier Bourry, Regis Pouillot, Andre Delicat et al. (2005). Emerging Infectious Diseases 11 (3) pp 385-390.
Abstract
During the 2001-2002 outbreak in Gabon, we observed that several dogs were highly exposed to Ebola virus by eating infected dead animals. To examine whether these animals became infected with Ebola virus, we sampled 439 dogs and screened them by Ebola virus-specific immunoglobulin (Ig) G assay, antigen detection, and viral polymerase chain reaction amplification. Seven (8.9 percent) of 79 samples from the 2 main towns, 15 (15.2 percent) of 99 samples from Mekambo, and 40
(25.2 percent) of 159 samples from villages in the Ebola virus-epidemic area had detectable Ebola virus-IgG, compared to only 2
(2 percent) of 102 samples from France. Among dogs from villages with both infected animal carcasses and human cases, seroprevalence was
31.8 percent. A significant positive direct association existed between seroprevalence and the distances to the Ebola virus-epidemic area. This study suggests that dogs can be infected by Ebola virus and that the putative infection is asymptomatic.
The full paper is available (free) on line at <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/11/3/pdfs/04-0981.pdf>. - Mod.AS
This is a discussion of Ebola outbreaks in Africa where up to 15 percent of confirmed cases were afebrile (without fever). But the amount of virus excreted increases in proportion to a fever, so at less than 101.5 degrees F, transmission is probably not very efficient. - Mod.JW]
Without knowing exactly what the break in procedure was its hard to speculate, however The risk of any disease that is carried by bodily fluids is much higher in a healthcare setting where they were trying to save his life with dialysis, intubation, starting IVs(probably large ones), arterial sticks to measure oxygen in the blood etc. vs just dealing with potentially sweat on sheets or saliva from drinking glasses etc.J.D. wrote:Wait, so a trained health care worker with all the proper procedures and equipment gets sick, but the family living in his apartment using the same bathroom and using the same sheets and towels are still OK?
There is some question about whether proper procedures were followed. The nurses are blaming poor administration.soulbringer wrote:J.D. wrote:Wait, so a trained health care worker with all the proper procedures and equipment gets sick, but the family living in his apartment using the same bathroom and using the same sheets and towels are still OK?
Nurses Union Statement wrote:The nurses' statement alleged that when Duncan was brought to Texas Health Presbyterian by ambulance with Ebola-like symptoms, he was “left for several hours, not in isolation, in an area” where up to seven other patients were. “Subsequently, a nurse supervisor arrived and demanded that he be moved to an isolation unit, yet faced stiff resistance from other hospital authorities,” they alleged.
Yup. I still believe we're looking at a failure to follow PPE protocols and not some type of misunderstanding with how the virus is transmitted. I also don't blame the nursing staff in any way as I would not expect them to be prepared to handle this type of treatment.Captain Caveman wrote:I'd be surprised, given 2 cases already, if several more health care workers dont come down with it too over the next few days. It's obvious they were ill-equipped to deal with Duncan.
I'm awaiting word of a major bloodbath affecting the entire upper management at that hospital. They had an opportunity to shine in the national spotlight and chose utter failure instead. This morning, some group that was representing nurses at the hospital (they are not unionized) cited anonymous complaints along the lines of "there were no protocols breached -- because there are no protocols in place."Ralph-Wiggum wrote:There's now a second case of Ebola in a Dallas hospital worker. Clearly the hospital's precautionary procedures weren't up-to-snuff.
From my biosafety research training there are specific guidelines when working with certain agents requiring specific protocols and protective gear. What they seemed to have had was a rolling standard of protection seemingly based on the patient's condition rather than the nature of the virus. And this part made me angry:“They kept adding more protective equipment as the patient [Duncan] deteriorated. They had masks first, then face shields, then the positive-pressure respirator. They added a second pair of gloves,” said Pierre Rollin, a CDC epidemiologist.
I realize bad things happen sometimes even with the most stringent precautions. But really CDC? You thought that letting the local neighborhood hospital manage this while giving advice from a distance would be enough? There was only one patient with Ebola so it's not like the resources of the CDC would be stretched. Was it a turf battle between the hospital or the CDC or did they just not think that the hospital needed any further advice?CDC Director Thomas Frieden expressed regret Tuesday that his agency had not done more to help the hospital control the infection. He said that, from now on, “Ebola response teams” will travel within hours to any hospital in the United States with a confirmed Ebola case. Already, one of those teams is in Texas and has put in place a site-manager system, requiring that someone monitor the use of personal protective equipment.
“I wish we had put a team like this on the ground the day the first patient was diagnosed,” he said. “That might have prevented this infection.”
In the Duncan case, the CDC sent disease detectives to help track down people who might have been exposed, but the agency largely let the hospital handle its own infection control.
We do an Nuclear/Biological/Chemical and Terrorism/Disaster drill every year. Some of that is federal and some of that is state. No idea what it's like in Texas.Jeff V wrote: When I worked for a hospital, we had regular exercises covering a range of scenarios. I participated in a large one that was held on a Saturday that included a hazmat component. We received good marks from the observers from the Illinois Department of Public Health, but I have no idea if the processes were adequate for this sort of thing. We (hospital management) were trained in emergency management. Now, I think that system (developed by FEMA FWIW) is more designed for finite events: mass casualties caused by a blown up building, transit incident, etc. Implementing it from the start would have helped the hospital staff focus on the problem at hand and not rely on potentially (now confirmed) inadequate SOP.
Not quite. Because public health is not mentioned explicitly in our Federal Constitution, primary responsibility (under the 10th Amendment) falls on the backs of the States. Essentially, the Texas State Health Department is the lead agency here and they ideally should have had plans in place on a county and local level to deal with this. Whether that looks like policies, training, gear, specialized teams, relationships with hospitals and clinics - it doesn't matter - Texas is responsible for "being ready".$iljanus wrote: Was it a turf battle between the hospital or the CDC or did they just not think that the hospital needed any further advice?
Hospital PPE protocols are (should be, anyway) based on the disease and risk of exposure/type of procedure, not the patient's symptoms.$iljanus wrote:What horrified me was this story in today Washington Post, specifically this portion:
From my biosafety research training there are specific guidelines when working with certain agents requiring specific protocols and protective gear. What they seemed to have had was a rolling standard of protection seemingly based on the patient's condition rather than the nature of the virus. And this part made me angry:“They kept adding more protective equipment as the patient [Duncan] deteriorated. They had masks first, then face shields, then the positive-pressure respirator. They added a second pair of gloves,” said Pierre Rollin, a CDC epidemiologist.
The unfortunate thing about biology is that pathogens don't recognize state sovereignty. I certainly see how states have this fear of onerous and costly Federal regulations so would like to manage their own affairs as much as possible but a patchwork response just won't cut it for certain things.Smoove_B wrote:Not quite. Because public health is not mentioned explicitly in our Federal Constitution, primary responsibility (under the 10th Amendment) falls on the backs of the States. Essentially, the Texas State Health Department is the lead agency here and they ideally should have had plans in place on a county and local level to deal with this. Whether that looks like policies, training, gear, specialized teams, relationships with hospitals and clinics - it doesn't matter - Texas is responsible for "being ready".$iljanus wrote: Was it a turf battle between the hospital or the CDC or did they just not think that the hospital needed any further advice?
The State Health Department would need to directly request assistance from the CDC (though I'm sure they offered it) and then coordinate with those federal agents. Pressure to do so would likely come from state and local elected officials, but I don't pretend to understand how Texas politics work in this situation; I can only comment on NJ and what would happen here.
All that being said, the federal government does have emergency-level powers of response but that would have probably required the President and/or Congress to step forward and task the CDC with something specific, assuming this was declared an "Emergency". Given our political situation, it doesn't surprise me this didn't happen.
Why do you hate the framers of the Constitution? What type of liberal-communist agenda are you trying to promote?$iljanus wrote:The unfortunate thing about biology is that pathogens don't recognize state sovereignty. I certainly see how states have this fear of onerous and costly Federal regulations so would like to manage their own affairs as much as possible but a patchwork response just won't cut it for certain things.
I have no doubts this single event will be researched, discussed, dissected and re-examined repeatedly for years to come. It's already provided me with more material than I can possible deal with.Murphy says some of the issues in Texas stem from a "system problem" in the way public health care is managed in the USA. The Centers for Disease Control provides only guidance for infection prevention and management. "What they do in Texas, what they do in Illinois, it's up to the state," he says.
"The question is, who's in charge?" Murphy says. "The states can follow all the guidelines and take the advice, which they usually do, but they don't have to. It's not a legal requirement. So there really is no one entity that's controlling things."
Heh, I'm sure Laurie Garrett is getting her next book ready as I type.Smoove_B wrote:Why do you hate the framers of the Constitution? What type of liberal-communist agenda are you trying to promote?$iljanus wrote:The unfortunate thing about biology is that pathogens don't recognize state sovereignty. I certainly see how states have this fear of onerous and costly Federal regulations so would like to manage their own affairs as much as possible but a patchwork response just won't cut it for certain things.
Over the weekend there was an article in USA Today (of all places) about our patchwork response problem:
I have no doubts this single event will be researched, discussed, dissected and re-examined repeatedly for years to come. It's already provided me with more material than I can possible deal with.Murphy says some of the issues in Texas stem from a "system problem" in the way public health care is managed in the USA. The Centers for Disease Control provides only guidance for infection prevention and management. "What they do in Texas, what they do in Illinois, it's up to the state," he says.
"The question is, who's in charge?" Murphy says. "The states can follow all the guidelines and take the advice, which they usually do, but they don't have to. It's not a legal requirement. So there really is no one entity that's controlling things."
LOL, I think Cuba's health care system would be well poised to handle this problem. They've also sent a large number of clinicians over to Africa.Why do you hate the framers of the Constitution? What type of liberal-communist agenda are you trying to promote?
I would need to go back and review Betray of Trust (a great book and weapon) to see if she predicted this, but my guess is no. She does cover the other Ebola outbreaks in Africa, so who knows. Regardless, it was written at a different point in time, so yes, she is probably gearing up for an update. She's been very active on Twitter, at least. She's merciless in her accounting, so I do hope she's able to come up with something.$iljanus wrote:Heh, I'm sure Laurie Garrett is getting her next book ready as I type.
My admittedly biased observation of Texas is that health care there is a game of political football where they're more concerned with things like shuttering women's health clinics than with emergency preparedness. Hell, up until 2011 rural hospitals in Texas couldn't even employ doctors. Health systems along for the ride just try to focus on profits.Smoove_B wrote: The State Health Department would need to directly request assistance from the CDC (though I'm sure they offered it) and then coordinate with those federal agents. Pressure to do so would likely come from state and local elected officials, but I don't pretend to understand how Texas politics work in this situation; I can only comment on NJ and what would happen here.
Forgive me if I don't make the same assumption.J.D. wrote:Good news is that as of Sunday we can assume all the "originals" who came in contact with Duncan (family, ER nurses, etc) are Ebola-free. And the two nurses who have it now were put in quarantine immediately after having symptoms. I'm guessing we'll see a couple more cases from within the hospital from those who were treating Duncan and then hopefully *fingers crossed* that's it from Dallas.
Smoove_B wrote: I live to serve. People surviving a hemorrhagic viral infection up until now has been quite rare. However, one of the last times it happened was a researcher that accidentally injected himself with Marburg in the lab waaaaaay back in 1971. Now, Marburg is a close relative of Ebola (not nearly as deadly), so it's not necessarily the same - but the Marburg virus was still found in his semen 61 days after he recovered. In theory this means people *could* be spreading it via semen after being cured and healthy, but we don't know because survival rates for Ebola historically speaking are terrible (< 10%). But I'm willing to bet for those that have been treated here in the United States, they'll be collecting fluid samples for the next year to see if they're still harboring the virus in any capacity.
You might be on to something. From Scientific American:LawBeefaroni wrote: Health systems along for the ride just try to focus on profits.
That might be the single-greatest article I've read on the subject so far.The Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas next blamed the error on their electronic medical record system (EMR). This is entirely plausible, as the many brands of EMR I am familiar with are seemingly designed to maximize billing and minimize liability, by giving the illusion of comprehensiveness. They are, however, extraordinarily poor for patient care, as they are so cluttered with needless, clinically irrelevant detail.
Yes, this is an important-- and optimistic-- point. No ebola cases among the family members supports the notion that contagion is more difficult when the patient is less symptomatic. Duncan was still very sick prior to being admitted to the hospital, but not at "hemorrhaging fever" levels that the healthcare workers were dealing with. Hopefully, that means that these healthcare workers who contracted ebola are extremely unlikely to pass it on, as they were isolated immediately upon coming down with a low-grade fever.J.D. wrote:Good news is that as of Sunday we can assume all the "originals" who came in contact with Duncan (family, ER nurses, etc) are Ebola-free. And the two nurses who have it now were put in quarantine immediately after having symptoms. I'm guessing we'll see a couple more cases from within the hospital from those who were treating Duncan and then hopefully *fingers crossed* that's it from Dallas.